印尼镍民族主义政策在中国技术面前受挫，中企发公开信抗议监管环境

On May 12, 2026, the China Chamber of Commerce in Indonesia issued a sharply worded open letter to Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, saying that Chinese firms operating locally have been burdened by stringent regulations, arbitrary law enforcement, and corruption and extortion by state officials. Those claims were reported by Reuters, Singapore’s Lianhe Zaobao and Indonesia’s Tempo.

Chinese investors in Indonesia have long opted to resolve disputes through quiet, behind-the-scenes negotiations. Thus, the letter’s high-profile public appeal to Jakarta’s top leadership thus marked a notable change in attitude and approach.

After years of disruptions brought by shifting policies and conflicting signals — not least the government’s recent move to centralize commodity trading under state authority —Chinese enterprises and firms apparently will no longer remain passive amid mounting operational pressures on their Indonesian investments.

Indonesia has rolled out a range of tightening measures, including lower mining quotas, higher export levies and stricter localization requirements. The changes have affected nearly all foreign players, not Chinese companies alone.

Japan’s Sumitomo Metal Mining has faced lengthy approval procedures for its smelting projects. LG Energy Solution has seen its nickel downstream operations hampered by quota cuts. Singaporean investors, especially those active in resources and energy, are grappling with tougher cross-border foreign exchange rules, which have considerably delayed profit repatriation.

As reported by Nikkei Asia, the Japan External Trade Organization has repeatedly raised concerns about Indonesia’s erratic policy landscape. Foreign enterprises engaged in resource processing and related supporting industries are finding their room for maneuver shrinking. For senior Indonesian business leaders of Chinese descent who witnessed past social unrest, the current policy tightening has stirred deep concerns about the predictability of the investment environment.

Waning investor sentiment is reflected in the performance of the Indonesian rupiah. Since the start of 2026, the currency has depreciated sharply against the US dollar, ranking among Asia’s worst performers. In June, the rupiah breached 18,000 against the US dollar, sinking to a historic low — below the level recorded during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.

In March 2026, Fitch Ratings revised Indonesia’s sovereign credit outlook from stable to negative, citing weakened policy credibility and growing uncertainty. Continued weekly net outflows from local bonds and equities have further destabilized the currency, sparking broader concerns over regional asset reallocation.

The government’s response to the business chamber’s letter failed to reassure the investment community. On May 14, 2026, Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa stated bluntly: “These minerals belong to us. If investors intend to leave, they can seek resources elsewhere.”

The comment laid bare the administration’s strong resource nationalism, making clear that Jakarta prioritizes its claims over mineral wealth even at the cost of losing foreign investment.

A day earlier, on May 13, President Prabowo acknowledged existing governance flaws in a public address. He conceded that lengthy permit procedures and excessive red tape stemmed from bureaucratic misconduct, with some officials demanding bribes to speed up administrative work. His remarks essentially validated the grievances raised by foreign business groups.

The divergent stances between the president and finance minister have exposed policy inconsistencies within the government, adding to market jitters. This friction highlights a broader debate on whether Jakarta is entering a new era of state interventionism.

Since early 2026, Indonesia has pursued aggressive supply-side curbs in the nickel sector, aiming to maximize gains from its resources and strengthen its bargaining power against foreign investors.

The country cut its 2026 national nickel ore production quota from 379 million tonnes to 250 million tonnes, representing a year-on-year reduction of 34%. It also lifted royalty rates for low-grade nickel ore from 17% to 30%, while introducing new taxes on associated cobalt, iron and chromium metals.

On April 15, 2026, the new royalty rate officially took effect. Faced with a steep rise in overall production costs, major Chinese-backed nickel producers including Tsingshan Group and Huayou Cobalt began adjusting operations in early May, with some moving to scale back output.

The trend dragged down the operating rate across Indonesia’s nickel smelting industry.

Staring down industrial slowdown and looming financial losses, Indonesia sought to build regional dominance via industrial alliances.

On May 7, during the ASEAN Summit in Cebu, the Indonesian Nickel Miners Association (APNI) and the Philippine Nickel Industry Association (PNIA) signed a memorandum of understanding to launch the Indonesia-Philippines Nickel Corridor, witnessed by economic ministers from both sides.

The two nations hold more than 70% of the world’s nickel reserves and sought to create a mechanism akin to a “nickel OPEC” to coordinate supply and guide pricing.

The breakdown stemmed not only from conflicting commercial interests but also from shifting geopolitics. As the alliance between the United States and the Philippines deepens, Manila has little incentive to align its long-term policies with Indonesia’s nickel downstream ecosystem, which relies heavily on Chinese capital.

Throughout May 2026, the Philippines accelerated approvals for new mining rights and expanded production capacity. Lacking a mature domestic smelting industry, it prioritized near-term economic gains.

The bulk of Philippine nickel ore is shipped to China, with only a small volume supplied to Indonesian smelters, according to the Manila Bulletin Industry Report. Further regional friction and strategic realignment can be seen in recent industry updates via The Manila Times and Metal.com.

Faced with production cuts by foreign firms and the collapse of its regional partnership, Indonesia announced a suspension of the royalty hike on May 11, 2026, fully reversing the policy within less than a month.

Many market watchers attribute the policy U-turn to the failure of regional resource coordination. Yet a more fundamental factor lies in the structural shift toward nickel-free production across downstream industries led by China, which has eroded long-term confidence in Indonesia’s resource-focused strategies.

While immediate pressures such as a weak rupiah and capital flight forced Jakarta to backtrack quickly, China’s technological advances have stripped Indonesia of the leverage to sustain restrictive policies.

From an industrial perspective, the nickel supply game long dominated by Indonesia and the Philippines looks increasingly outdated amid today’s technological evolution, leaving limited room for sustained profit-taking.

First, China has achieved large-scale adoption of nickel-free solutions in new-energy power batteries. High-nickel ternary batteries, once mainstream, are being phased out and replaced by lithium iron phosphate (LFP) batteries that contain no nickel or cobalt.

Official data tracked internationally by S&P Global Mobility Chemical and Battery Ecosystem Insights shows that LFP batteries accounted for 81% to 82% of newly installed power batteries in China in early 2026, while the share of high-nickel ternary products fell below 20%. As the biggest consumption hub for nickel, the new-energy vehicle sector has structurally reduced its reliance on the metal.

Second, the large-scale commercialization of sodium-ion batteries has further diminished nickel’s strategic importance. Major Chinese manufacturers including CATL and BYD have rolled out mass production of sodium-ion batteries free of lithium, nickel and cobalt, with cost and performance levels matching mai

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