中国对以色列投资下降，与阿联酋拉斯海马签署谅解备忘录，沙特、阿曼及埃及或有项目

Trends in Chinese Investment in Israel - INSS, by Tomer Fadlon and Roy Ben Tzur. In my previous post I used China-Israel relations as a model of a potential China-Gulf future scenario, and noted the contrast between peak China-Israel hype in 2017 and what has happened since. And then yesterday INSS published this report looking at dwindling Chinese investment into Israel, showing that by number of investments, 2018 was the high point and there has been a steady decline since. At the same time, trade has continued to grow.

If you’re looking for a good report that shows how people were thinking about China-Israel tech ties in 2020, I’d recommend this one from RAND, written by Shira Efron, Karen Schwindt, and Emily Haskel: Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure: Security Implications for Israel and the United States. I read it when it came out and skimmed through it again last week. Read against this INSS report, it’s a good reminder of how quickly things can change.

In recent years, a profound shift has occurred in China’s economic involvement in Israel, which, since 2020, has been reflected in a sharp and sustained decline in both the volume of investments and the number of transactions. Chinese investment hit its lowest point in 2023, totaling only 39 million NIS, about 0.12% of all foreign investment in Israel that year. This trend stems from several factors: intensifying great-power competition and US pressure to limit Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors; the establishment of Israel’s foreign investment screening mechanism; the adoption of a more selective and cautious approach in Beijing’s global investment policy, alongside the effects of the COVID-19 crisis; and the repercussions of the Swords of Iron war, which led to postponed deals, reduced business travel, and heightened political tensions. However, this shift does not reflect economic “disconnect,” but rather a transition to a more limited and selective pattern of engagement: Chinese focus on minority investments in sectors considered relatively low in security sensitivity, such as fintech. Notably, Chinese state-owned enterprises have nearly disappeared from the Israeli market entirely. The data indicate that Chinese investments constitute a small share of total foreign investment in Israel and that the primary risks today lie not in direct ownership of strategic assets but in areas such as supply chain dependency, transfer of knowledge and technology, and information-related risks.

In recent years, a profound shift has occurred in China’s economic involvement in Israel, which, since 2020, has been reflected in a sharp and sustained decline in both the volume of investments and the number of transactions. Chinese investment hit its lowest point in 2023, totaling only 39 million NIS, about 0.12% of all foreign investment in Israel that year. This trend stems from several factors: intensifying great-power competition and US pressure to limit Chinese involvement in sensitive sectors; the establishment of Israel’s foreign investment screening mechanism; the adoption of a more selective and cautious approach in Beijing’s global investment policy, alongside the effects of the COVID-19 crisis; and the repercussions of the Swords of Iron war, which led to postponed deals, reduced business travel, and heightened political tensions. However, this shift does not reflect economic “disconnect,” but rather a transition to a more limited and selective pattern of engagement: Chinese focus on minority investments in sectors considered relatively low in security sensitivity, such as fintech. Notably, Chinese state-owned enterprises have nearly disappeared from the Israeli market entirely. The data indicate that Chinese investments constitute a small share of total foreign investment in Israel and that the primary risks today lie not in direct ownership of strategic assets but in areas such as supply chain dependency, transfer of knowledge and technology, and information-related risks.

Chinese financial institutions deepen partnership with UAE - China Daily. Ras Al Khaimah (RAK to the cool kids) is one of the 7 emirates that comprise the UAE, and as I’ve written about at different times over the past year or so, it has been pursuing deeper ties with China. Its ruler, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi, made 2 trips to China in the fall of 2024, visiting Xiamen, Dongguan, Shenzhen and Guangdong.

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