中国海湾外交：王毅与伊朗外长通话

Greetings from Singapore, where I’m visiting for the upcoming Middle East Institute’s annual conference. And spending too much time in hawker centres. In the meantime, a rather long post for your weekend:

The Day After: America, China and a Changed Middle East - China Considered. I joined Liz Economy on her excellent China Considered podcast on Monday, shortly after the US-Iran ceasefire was announced. We were planning a 45 minute conversation, ran to an hour, and really it felt like we could’ve gone for another hour or so. Still, we managed to cover a lot of terrain in the time we had. If you don’t already subscribe to China Considered I highly recommend that you do.

Leading off with some Chinese diplomacy in the Gulf. Wang Yi and his Iranian counterpart Araghchi spoke this week. I imagine Araghchi was puffed up quite a bit after the world had time to absorb the terms of the MOU the Iranians had signed with the US.

I also suspect that Wang was not especially comfortable with the position China finds itself in, with a clear and long-standing preference for Gulf predictability upended by an empowered Iran that has benefited tremendously from military aggression. You may think Beijing is happy with this result. I disagree.

Iran’s new regime is very different from the second republic, the one China has been working with for decades. In a recent essay in Foreign Affairs, Suzanne Maloney wrote:

The first republic, helmed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was a revolutionary experiment that sought to impose religious rule at home and destabilize its neighbors. Ali Khamenei’s rule launched the second republic, which institutionalized the dominance of the supreme leader’s office and empowered the military through its role in reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In engineering Mojtaba’s rise, the regime is seeking to establish the third republic: an explicitly praetorian state, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the wider security apparatus firmly in control of decision-making over all aspects of governance, society, and foreign policy.

The first republic, helmed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was a revolutionary experiment that sought to impose religious rule at home and destabilize its neighbors. Ali Khamenei’s rule launched the second republic, which institutionalized the dominance of the supreme leader’s office and empowered the military through its role in reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. In engineering Mojtaba’s rise, the regime is seeking to establish the third republic: an explicitly praetorian state, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the wider security apparatus firmly in control of decision-making over all aspects of governance, society, and foreign policy.

The power of the IRGC in Iran now challenges the economics-driven approach to the Middle East that China has been developing for decades. China and Iran have reasonably good relations, but the idea that an Islamic Republic and a Communist Part state are ideologically compatible has always been a stretch. Whatever ideology that links them has always been one of grievance, that the Western dominated order is unfair and that their civilization states don’t get the respect that they’re due. Other than that, the alignment is pretty thin.

Yes, the idea that a Communist Party state and hereditary monarchies are ideologically compatible is also a stretch, but China and the GCC states share legitimacy models that emphasize performance: “we should be in power because we’re making your lives better. You’re material well-being is improving under us.” That China’s government and companies are dealing with like-minded, similarly motivated counterparts on the Arabian side of the Gulf makes for more natural cooperation.

I recently spoke with a Chinese Middle East expert, who made an interesting anedotal point: “My colleagues who study Israel like visiting there. They’re interested in the culture and society. Same with my colleagues who study Arab countries. Most of my colleagues who study Iran resent it.”

I digress. My point is, I think China finds it far easier working with Middle Eastern countries that are status quo oriented - the GCC, Egypt, Jordan - and that’s where you’ll find the lion’s share of their trade, investment, and overseas populations. An emboldened Iran is not in China’s interests. That’s not to understate the enormous challenges facing Iran’s third republic - there’s no evidence that they’re going to be any good at governing, or managing a battered economy, or conducting diplomacy, and I suspect that they’ll be rather bad at all three. But for the time being, they’ve won this round to everyone else’s detriment.

Wang Yi Has a Phone Call with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi - PRC MOFA.

On June 17, 2026, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi upon request.Seyyed Abbas Araghchi briefed Wang Yi on the first-phase memorandum of understanding (MoU) reached between Iran and the United States, and expressed sincere gratitude to China for its positive role in advancing the negotiations and concluding the agreement. He stated that the MoU should be implemented practically, including Israel’s halt to military operations against Lebanon. Iran consistently views its relations with China from a strategic perspective and looks forward to deepening mutual trust, expanding cooperation across all sectors, and jointly advancing the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.Wang Yi said China welcomes the conclusion of the first-phase MoU between Iran and the United States. Facts have proven that force and power politics cannot resolve disputes, and dialogue and negotiation represent the right path forward. As comprehensive strategic partners, China has always stood by Iran’s reasonable and legitimate propositions, supported Iran in safeguarding its sovereignty and security, backed mediation efforts by Pakistan and the international community, and consistently worked in China’s own way to end hostilities and promote peace. The dawn of peace has emerged. The priority going forward is for all parties to deliver earnestly on their commitments and fend off disturbances from all sides. The issue of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz needs to be properly addressed to respond appropriately to the widespread concerns of the international community. China supports Iran’s efforts to improve relations with regional countries and explore the joint development of a regional security architecture. China stands ready to strengthen communication and coordination with Iran, consolidate and deepen China-Iran relations, and continue contributing to safeguarding and advancing peace and stability in the region.

On June 17, 2026, Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with Iranian Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araghchi upon request.

Seyyed Abbas Araghchi briefed Wang Yi on the first-phase memorandum of understanding (MoU) reached between Iran and the United States, and expressed sincere gratitude to China for its positive role in advancing the negotiations and concluding the agreement. He stated that the MoU should be implemented practically, including Israel’s halt to military operations against Lebanon. Iran consistently views its relations with China from a strategic perspective and looks forward to deepening mutual trust, expanding cooperation across all sectors, and jointly advancing the comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries.

Wang Yi said China welcomes the conclusion of the first-phase MoU between Iran and the United States. Facts have proven that force and power politics cannot resolve disputes, and dialogue and negotiation represent the right path forward. As comprehensive strategic partners, China

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