回归常态？中国与中东北非地区密集签署合作备忘录

I’m finally getting back to a normal-ish schedule after spending a lot of June traveling and then seeing two of my sons off for their summer break. I’m leading off with four recent piece from friends that I think you’ll find useful.

But the interesting part for me is the links that come after, which taken together make for a long list of the types of stories we’d regularly see before Trump launched his ill-conceived, disasterously-conducted war. (I feel I have to make this point repeatedly, since so many folks in the US media ecosystem are trying to make the case for a win, which is just a new level of shamelessness. But I digress.) Right, the types of China-MENA stories we used to see. They’re about MoUs in renewable energy, smart cities, AI, investment, supply chain security, and building connections. I don’t know if that is a sign of a return to normalcy, a sign that Chinese companies feel the risk factor has returned to an acceptable level, or a sign of Arab governments and companies hustling for opportunities. In any case, it’s a pleasant break from a stupid war.

China Has Not Escaped the Middle East. It Has Learned to Live with the Risk - by Andrea Ghiselli, for RUSI. Andrea’s China-MENA stuff is always worth reading, and this short commentary for RUSI is no exception:

The defeat of the United States—or, more precisely, of Donald Trump—raises many questions about the future of the region. However, it also provides an answer to an old question: can China secure the oil flows on which its economy still depends? The answer is less dramatic, but more important, than much of the commentary suggests. China has not volunteered to mediate between the warring parties. Nor has it expanded its military presence. Instead, it has turned a dangerous dependence into a managed vulnerability.

The defeat of the United States—or, more precisely, of Donald Trump—raises many questions about the future of the region. However, it also provides an answer to an old question: can China secure the oil flows on which its economy still depends? The answer is less dramatic, but more important, than much of the commentary suggests. China has not volunteered to mediate between the warring parties. Nor has it expanded its military presence. Instead, it has turned a dangerous dependence into a managed vulnerability.

‘Knowledge-Based’ Economy Facilitates Tech Transfers to Iran - by Tuvia Gering, for China Brief. A new piece from Tuvia that you’ll want to read. Here’s the executive summary:

Iran’s network of state-run “innovation houses” and trade platforms is a main channel for acquiring sanctioned dual-use technology from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Like the oil trade, it is steered from the top on both sides and shielded by mutual deniability.

Iran’s network of state-run “innovation houses” and trade platforms is a main channel for acquiring sanctioned dual-use technology from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Like the oil trade, it is steered from the top on both sides and shielded by mutual deniability.

The Iranian Vice Presidency for Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy (VPST) and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked arm, embeds Iranian firms in the PRC’s military-civil fusion and united front systems, and steers them toward military-linked suppliers.

The Iranian Vice Presidency for Science, Technology, and Knowledge-Based Economy (VPST) and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-linked arm, embeds Iranian firms in the PRC’s military-civil fusion and united front systems, and steers them toward military-linked suppliers.

Throughput is still modest, but wartime devastation, a new U.S. oil-sanctions waiver, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s elevation as Iran’s special envoy for the PRC are hardening the network into a durable procurement pipeline, positioned to tap into the proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund.

Throughput is still modest, but wartime devastation, a new U.S. oil-sanctions waiver, and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf’s elevation as Iran’s special envoy for the PRC are hardening the network into a durable procurement pipeline, positioned to tap into the proposed $300 billion reconstruction fund.

The new non-alignment: How the Middle East is carving out room to maneuver in AI - by Bilal Biloch, for Atlantic Council. Bilal joined the Atlantic Council as a nonresident fellow recently - great fit on both sides. He’s uniquely positioned to understand the geopolitics-AI nexus, and I always have time for his analysis.

The Gulf states’ simultaneous engagement with American AI companies and Chinese hardware suppliers looks like opportunism only if you expect binary alignment. When the technology-conscious Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru built the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, its critics called it equivocation. It was the opposite: an assertion of strategic agency, a refusal to subordinate national interests to either superpower’s terms. The Gulf states are constructing room for maneuver in a world bipolar at its center, where Washington and Beijing still set the frontier, and multipolar at its edges, where everyone else does the negotiating, with limited formal coordination among themselves to date.

The Gulf states’ simultaneous engagement with American AI companies and Chinese hardware suppliers looks like opportunism only if you expect binary alignment. When the technology-conscious Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru built the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, its critics called it equivocation. It was the opposite: an assertion of strategic agency, a refusal to subordinate national interests to either superpower’s terms. The Gulf states are constructing room for maneuver in a world bipolar at its center, where Washington and Beijing still set the frontier, and multipolar at its edges, where everyone else does the negotiating, with limited formal coordination among themselves to date.

Beyond the Axis - by Peter Salisbury, for Century International. This long report (62 page PDF) will be of interest for many of you. It helps explain why “why Iran and the Axis have proven so resilient in the face of U.S. and Israeli attempts to crush them.” Peter was working on it well before the latest round of the US-Israel-Iran war escalated in late February - we had a coffee in Abu Dhabi in January when he was in the Gulf doing interviews - but the timing makes it especially relevant. Beyond the regional impact of the project, there is a China angle, tracking procurement of Chinese components for Houthi weapons from a China-based Yemeni network.

The Axis of Resistance has proven exceptionally resilient because it represents a new kind of dispersed power that is a distinct feature of a highly interconnected world—a type of challenge that will shape the twenty-first century.

The Axis of Resistance has proven exceptionally resilient because it represents a new kind of dispersed power that is a distinct feature of a highly interconnected world—a type of challenge that will shape the twenty-first century.

Over the past twenty-five years, both the Axis and international commerce have been rewired from hub-and-spoke networks with identifiable choke points into complex, adaptive ecosystems with no clear points of failure.

Over the past twenty-five years, both the Axis and international commerce have been rewired from hub-and-spoke networks with identifiable choke points into complex, adaptive ecosystems with no clear points of failure.

This report uses a unique research strategy, combining historical survey, deep field research, open-source investigations, and data analysis to describe and explain these twin transformations in unprecedented detail.

This report uses a unique research strategy, combining historical survey, deep field research, open-source investigations, and data analysis to describe and explain these twin transformations in unprecedented detail.

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